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Introduction
Timeliness, the period of limitation for bringing claims in arbitration, is often raised as a defense either in arbitration proceedings or
in court. Being a condition precedent to arbitration, it is often unclear
whether timeliness is in itself arbitrable. Such lack of clarity bolsters the
accrual of uncertainties as to whom of the tribunal or the court should
determine the outcome of a question.
In determining the arbitrability of an issue, the U.S. Supreme Court
has generally held that the question turns upon what the parties agreed
about that specific matter.2 Therefore, whether an issue is to be decided
by the arbitrator or a court is ultimately a matter of the parties’ contractual intent3 and parties are required to submit to arbitration only those
disputes they have agreed to be arbitrable.4
In practice however, parties many times fail to include express provisions regarding limitations issues in the arbitration agreement, notably
American University Washington College of Law, J.D. Candidates 2013.
Specifically, the question is the following: did the parties agree to submit the
arbitrability question itself to arbitration? First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
3
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56 (1995).
4
See First Options, 514 U.S. at 947 (holding that because one party did not clearly
agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the issue was subject to
review by courts).
1
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timeliness. Thus, a court faced with a motion to compel or stay arbitration must determine who the parties intended to decide such issues.
Today, in the absence of an express agreement between the parties as to
the arbitrability of pre-arbitration issues, resolution of the “who decides”
issue may ultimately depend on which federal court is making the determination. Circuit courts are split as to who should resolve the timeliness
question.5 Traditionally, in the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth
circuits, the trend had been that the arbitrator would decide matters
of timeliness, at least when governed by the National Association of
Securities Dealers rule (hereinafter “NASD”).6 On the other hand, the
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits decided that, under
the NASD rule, courts should determine timeliness.7
In 2002, the Supreme Court rendered a decision that put to rest the
interpretation of timeliness in the context of the NASD rule—but it
was unclear how the courts would interpret it with regards to arbitration clauses outside the NASD’s realm.8 Today, there is still dissonance
among the courts on how to approach the issue.9 In Bechtel v. UEG
Araucária,10 the most recent decision addressing the arbitrability of
timeliness, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
that the question was for the arbitrators, not courts, to decide. However,
because that decision was not based on Supreme Court precedent, the
issue of timeliness in non-NASD context still remains unresolved in
other circuits.
This Article will examine developments in American jurisprudence
as to arbitral timeliness and attempt to reconcile each court’s approach
to that issue. Part I will provide the historical context of timeliness as
a procedural or substantive arbitrability issue. Part II will discuss the
current trend towards timeliness as a procedural issue. Finally, Part III
argues that federal courts should adopt the current trend of addressing
timeliness as a procedural issue to be settled by the arbitrator in order to
preserve the sanctity of the arbitration process.

Lawrence W. Newman, Charles M. Davidson, Arbitrability of Timeliness
Defenses: Who Decides? 14 J. Int’l Arb. 137, 138 (1997).
6
Id. at 142.
7
These courts considered timeliness a component of arbitrability. Id. at 141.
8
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
9
However, some courts have tried to reconcile these constructions across provisions
regarding choice of law.
10
Bechtel do Brasil v. UEG Araucária, 638 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2011).
5
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I. Is Timeliness an Issue of Procedural or Substantive
Arbitrability?
The tension between submitting the interpretation of time-barred
claims to arbitrators or the courts mired many of the arbitration disputes
leading up to Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.11 Traditionally, the
Federal Circuit Courts have held that timeliness is an issue of substantive arbitrability to be decided by the courts. In Howsam however, the
Supreme Court established a new presumption that issues regarding the
timeliness of a claim should be submitted to the arbitration tribunal—
absent some provision indicating otherwise.12
A. Traditional Judicial Approach to Timeliness as a
Substantive Arbitrability Issue
The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have traditionally treated timeliness as an issue of substantive arbitrability and
thus as a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be satisfied for a dispute
to be eligible for arbitration.13 These Circuits have held that the courts,
instead of arbitrators, must determine arbitrability in the first instance.14
To determine the arbitrability of an issue, these jurisdictions ask whether
the agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular
grievance, which ultimately turns on an interpretation of the parties’
intent.15 Courts have typically engaged in a two-step analysis to resolve
this question.16
First, under the Supreme Court precedent AT&T Technologies, Inc.
v. Communications Workers of America, the issue of whether the parties
have agreed to arbitrate their dispute is for the courts to decide.17 The
Court in AT&T Technologies, Inc., reasoned that because arbitration
Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 137.
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85.
13
Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476 (10th
Cir. 1996); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F. 3d 381, 383-84
(11th Cir. 1995); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1378 (3d Cir. 1993);
Roney and Co. v. Kassab, 981 F. 2d 894, 898 (6th Cir. 1992); Edward D. Jones & Co.
v. Sorrells, 957 F. 2d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1992).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 139.
17
See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)
(“Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator.”).
11
12
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is a matter of contract, parties could only submit to arbitration those
disputes that both parties have agreed to be arbitrated.18 Courts should
hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on who should decide arbitrability as giving the arbitrators that power, for “doing so might too often
force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have
thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.”19
Second, the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits have
examined the arbitration provisions to determine whether there is “clear
and unmistakable” evidence of the parties’ intent to arbitrate the timebar issue.20 In instances where the arbitration clauses’ language was
ambiguous (i.e. where the clause failed to expressly allocate to the arbitrators the determination of statute of limitations defenses), these courts
have generally held that clear and unmistakable evidence of such intent
to arbitrate was absent and that the issue of timeliness thus belonged to
the court.21
The Tenth Circuit in Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch accordingly held
that it was the district court, and not the arbitrator, who had jurisdiction
to determine whether the parties’ claims were time-barred by §15 of the
NASD Code.22 After finding that there was not a “clear and unmistakable” expression of the parties’ intent to give the arbitrator the power to
decide whether § 15 bars it from exercising jurisdiction,23 the court held
that it could not compel arbitration because more than six years had
elapsed, causing the claim to be time-barred.24
The courts in the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits
reconciled their decision of timeliness as a judicial determination with

See id. (“The duty to arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission
to arbitration cannot precede judicial determination that the collective bargaining
agreement does in fact create such a duty.”).
19
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
20
E.g., Cogswell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 78 F.3d 474, 476
(10th Cir. 1996) (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 945).
21
Id. at 478 (“If we conclude the agreement is silent, ambiguous, or devoid of
“clear and unmistakable” evidence the parties intended the arbitrators to determine the
applicability of § 15 of the NASD Code, we must conclude the parties intended for the
court to decide whether it applies”).
22
Cogswell, 78 F.3d at 478.
23
Id. at 481 (holding that the plaintiff had not identified any evidence tending to
show the clear and unmistakable intent of the parties to have the arbitrator decide the
issue of timeliness).
24
Id.
18
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other circuits holding that arbitrators should decide by applying the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc.:
Courts should not assume that the parties agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and
unmistakabl[e]” evidence that they did so. . . . In this
manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the
question “who (primarily) should decide arbitrability”
differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity
about the question “whether a particular merits-related
dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a
valid arbitration agreement,-for in respect to this latter
question the law reverses the presumption.”25
The Supreme Court has held that “due regard must be given to the
federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of
the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.”26 However,
this presumption in favor of arbitration is not applicable when the question to be resolved is who decides the arbitrability question itself.27
B. Recent Judicial Approach to Timeliness as a Procedural
Issue: the Howsam and Bechtel decisions
In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court opted
to treat timeliness as a procedural issue reserved for the determination of
the arbitrators.28 The case involved claims arising from a dispute between
a private investor, Howsam, and Dean Witter, the brokerage firm that
had provided her financial advice.29 In particular, Howsam claimed that
the firm had misrepresented the economic value of the partnerships she
was told to invest in.30 The dispute continued and Howsam eventually
opted for arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers
(hereinafter “NASD”) under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure
(hereinafter “NASD Code”).31 The issue arose when Dean Witter sought
a declaration in Federal District Court that arbitration was no longer
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (U.S.N.C.
1983).
27
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 476 (1989).
28
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
29
Id. at 81.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 82.
25
26
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feasible because the dispute accrued more than six years before the
initiation of arbitration—thus rendering the entire arbitral proceedings
time-barred under Section 10304 of the applicable NASD Code.32 Indeed,
Section 10304 provides that no dispute “shall be eligible for submission
. . . where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving
rise to the dispute.”33 The district court dismissed the action, finding that
courts had no jurisdiction to interpret the NASD Code. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court and held
that the parties had not clearly and unmistakably allocated the issue of
arbitrability itself to the arbitrators.34 Thus, because the Court found that
the determination of whether the arbitration was time-barred inherently
affected the dispute’s arbitrability, it also ruled that the issue was within
the primary jurisdiction of the courts as the parties had not expressly and
unequivocally allocated the question to the tribunal.35
Granting certiorari, the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the
Tenth Circuit, reasoning that as a question inherently procedural in
nature, timeliness was for the strict determination of the arbitrators.36
The Court’s rationale stressed that the timeliness of the arbitration was
a procedural condition precedent to arbitration that did not involve a
decision of whether the parties were bound by the arbitration clause of
their agreement.37 Rather, the time limit rule “closely resembles” gateway questions that the Court has not found to be questions of arbitrability38 and that are inherently part of the dispute itself, to be determined
by the tribunal. In reaching its conclusion, the Court also considered
that requiring the timeliness issue to be determined by the courts would
delay and antagonize the purpose of arbitration clauses in the first place:
mechanisms that bypass the court system to provide quick and effective
remedies.39 Finally, the Court emphasized that because NASD arbitrators are more experienced, they are more apt to interpret and apply their
own timeliness rule.40
Id.
NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure § 10304 (1984).
34
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Howsam, 261 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 2001), rev’d.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
35
Id.
36
Howsam, 537 U.S. at 79.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 85.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 85.
32
33
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In spite of the Court’s clear ruling in Howsam, the federal circuits
are still divided on the issue of the arbitrability of timeliness, some
questioning the precedential value of the decision, which was rendered
in the NASD context. Thus, the decisions that elected to follow the procedural approach remain particularly relevant to understand the import
of Howsam. In 2011, in Bechtel v. UEG Araucária, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit decided that the issue was one for the arbitrators, not the courts to decide.41 Although the Bechtel decision sprung
from a jurisdiction that has traditionally viewed questions of timeliness
as the type that should be submitted to the arbitrator, this decision could
highlight the shift initiated by Howsam towards time-bars as a procedural
issue of arbitrability.42 In Bechtel, Bechtel do Brasil, Bechtel Canada, and
Bechtel International (“Bechtel”) had entered in 2000 into an agreement
with UEG Araucária (“UEGA”) for services regarding the construction
of a power plant in Araucária, Brazil.43 The agreement, construed together
with governing—procedural and substantive—law provisions indicated
that the parties intended to submit disputes arising from the breach or
execution of their contract to arbitration.44 Additionally, the agreement
provided that its provisions should be interpreted under New York law.45
In late 2002, Bechtel completed its construction and examination
of the power plant and notified UEGA.46 UEGA certified its acceptance
of the power plant, but due to extraneous circumstances, did not start

Bechtel do Brasil v. UEG Araucária, 638 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2011).
Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 142.
43
Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 152.
44
Art. 37.2. of the Contract read: “Any dispute, controversy, or claim arising
out of or relating to the Contract, or the breach, termination or validity thereof . . .
shall be finally settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation
and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”) then in
effect (the “Rules”), except as these rules may be modified herein.” Art. 37.2.2 read:
“Any arbitration proceeding or award rendered hereunder and the validity, effect and
interpretation of this agreement to arbitrate shall be governed by the laws of the state
of New York.” The Contract also contained a “Law and Procedure” section specifying
that “The law which is to apply to the Contract and under which the Contract is to
be construed is the law of the state of New York without regard to the jurisdiction’s
conflicts of laws rules” and “the law governing the procedure and administration of
any arbitration instituted pursuant to Clause 37 is the law of the State of New York.”
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
41
42
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operating the power plant until December 2006.47 In 2008, one of the
mechanical components of the power plant failed, and UEGA filed for
arbitration based on a claim of deficiency in Bechtel’s services and for
negligent misrepresentation.48 Bechtel asserted the defense that UEGA’s
claim was time-barred and therefore could not be asserted in arbitration.
Bechtel based this defense on a New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
provision which states:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made
or notice of intention to arbitrate was served, the claim
sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limitation of time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a
party may assert the limitation as a bar to the arbitration
on an application to the court.49
As a result, the issue of arbitrability of the timeliness of a claim
came before the courts.50 The district court determined that arbitration
should be permanently stayed because UEGA asserted its claim after
the time-bar in New York, which prevented it from compelling Bechtel
to submit to arbitration.51 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the decision and ordered that the question of
timeliness be submitted to the arbitrator—not the court. The reversal
was motivated by the Court’s reasoning that the arbitrator would have
to decide the issue of whether an arbitration claim was time-barred,52 as
the issue of when the limitation time starts to run constitutes an element
of the dispute that cannot be separated from the rest of the arbitration
claims.
Although Bechtel did not cite to Supreme Court precedent in reaching its ruling, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Howsam is particularly
useful in analyzing Bechtel. Indeed, both cases are similar in that they
involve disputes regarding the terms of a time-provision not explicitly
included in those terms. Second, although Howsam specifically implicates a NASD rule—and Bechtel does not—the timeliness issues are
both determinative of the arbitrator’s ability to rule on the matter. Third,
as in Howsam, the parties in Bechtel agreed prior to the dispute to submit
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id.
Id.
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7502(b).
Bechtel, 638 F.3d at 152.
Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 152.
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all claims to arbitration.53 This means that, according to the executed
agreement, the parties in Bechtel did not intend to reserve a special
exception for timeliness to be submitted to the court.54 Moreover, the
decision to include an arbitration clause reflected the parties’ interest in
the efficient resolution of any potential disputes, as the Court described
in Howsam.55 For these reasons, the Bechtel decision further supports
the assertion laid out in Howsam, that issues regarding the timeliness of
claims should be submitted to the arbitrator as a procedural condition
precedent to arbitration, rather than a substantive question of arbitrability beyond the arbitrators’ reach.
II. The Judicial Shift Towards Framing the Issue of Timeliness as
One of Procedural Arbitrability
Until recently, various circuit courts approached questions regarding the arbitrability of timeliness claims differently.56 Since Howsam
however, the presumption of submitting claims of timeliness to the
arbitrator seems to be finally somewhat influencing the approaches of
the various Federal circuits.
Although the courts have indicated in the past that they “do not
establish a bright line rule that timeliness questions must inexorably go
to the arbitrator,”57 circuit courts now seem to look for contractual provisions granting jurisdiction to the court over time-bar issues.58 In the
absence of such contractual provisions, the courts appear to be allowing
the claims to go through the arbitration procedure. This reflects both the
presumption outlined in Howsam with regards to the specific NASD
rule, but also places emphasis on the parties’ ultimate decision to arbitrate.59 By leaving open the option of contracting otherwise, the courts
seem to sidestep the issue of a de facto bar on timeliness claims, and
establish a more predictable structure that would allow parties to enter
contracts with more certainty of being able to avoid excessive litigation
costs.
Id.
Id.
55
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002).
56
Newman & Davidson, supra note 5, at 141-42.
57
United Steel Workers of America v. Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 505
F.3d 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2007).
58
Id.
59
Id.
53
54
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One of the more prominent cases following Howsam, United Steel
Workers of America v. Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., involved
a labor dispute between the United Steel Workers of America and a
manufacturing company.60 The case employed the Howsam presumption structure and indicates explicitly in dicta that “parties who wish to
steer timeliness disputes to the courts remain free to do so and nothing
in this opinion is to the contrary.”61 The parties in this case however,
were silent on the issue of timeliness when they established the arbitration procedure to resolve their grievances. Through this ruling the
presumption outlined by the Supreme Court in Howsam was extended
to the timeliness claims in other arbitration disputes—ones that do not
necessarily implicate the NASD rule.62
This development is a stark departure from the previous approach
that the Sixth Circuit had taken on issues of arbitrability. The Sixth
Circuit, along with the Third, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits
traditionally submitted claims to the courts for determination on the
timeliness issue.63 Although the Sixth Circuit has not expressed a prohibition on submitting such claims to the courts, it becomes an exception
that must have been clearly outlined by the parties. The presumption
requires the contracting party seeking court assistance to rebut the
notion that the issue of timeliness should be submitted to the arbitrator.
The court in the United Steel Workers case based this determination on
the notion that:
[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, issues
of substantive arbitrability . . . are for a court to decide
and issues of procedural arbitrability, i.e. whether prerequisites such as time limits, notice, laches, estoppels,
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been met, are for the arbitrators to decide.”64
By grounding its decision in the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act,
the court further bolsters its approach to timeliness as a procedural
issue and indicates an authentic and authoritative source on practices

Id. at 417.
Id. at 424.
62
Id. at 425.
63
Newman & Davidson, supra note 5 at 141.
64
United Steel Workers of America, 505 F.3d at 424 (citing RUAA sec. 6 cmt. 2,
ULA at 13).
60
61
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and procedures in arbitration.65 Consequently, the Sixth circuit’s shift in
approach can be said to indicate the growing trend to abandon timeliness as a question of arbitrability and instead focusing on timeliness as
a question of procedure.
III. Why Timeliness as a Procedural Arbitrability Issue Preserves
The Effectiveness of the Arbitral Process
The trend towards approaching timeliness as procedural arbitrability is consistent with the international endorsement of the arbitration
process. As a procedural issue, time-bar defenses are directed to arbitrators to resolve, thereby deferring to arbitration questions that would
otherwise be litigated in courts. In the international context, arbitration
is a flexible form of alternate dispute resolution meant to benefit all parties to a contract. The objective of arbitration is to eliminate some of the
costs associated with traditional litigation while expediting the resolution to a claim. When parties enter litigation to determine the timeliness
of a claim as an eligibility issue, they effectively eliminate the advantages of an arbitration clause. The cost-savings and efficiencies that are
the pinnacle of the arbitration process are countered by the litigation
delays and costs of a court determining whether a claim is arbitrable.
Furthermore, procedural issues are intertwined with the merits of the
dispute, thus, reservation of procedural issues for the courts provides
opportunity for inefficiencies that stem from duplication of efforts.
A jurisdictional characterization of timeliness shifts the authority to determine the scope of arbitrators’ power from the arbitrators
themselves to the court. Deference to the courts to resolve timeliness
defenses establishes precedent for the courts to decide on other limitation defenses. Such precedent threatens the sanctity of the arbitration
process, as it exponentially expands the power of courts to stay arbitration proceedings. The current trend towards deferring time-bar defenses
to arbitrators can preserve the sanctity of the arbitration process by
increasing court predictability. Once parties are aware that the courts
will defer time-bar defenses to arbitrators, they are able to forgo costly
litigation in favor of arbitration to settle such claims.

65

Id.
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Howsam held that arbitrators should decide
the issue of timeliness.66 However, that decision was rendered in the
narrow context of the NASD Code, which differs from other arbitral
codes. In instances in which parties have agreed that the arbitration is
to be governed by rules containing limitations, timeliness provisions
could be treated as evidence of the parties’ intent regarding the arbitrability of those limitations. Otherwise, there may still be a question as
to their intent regarding the determination of limitations to arbitration.
Resolving the issue of whether the arbitrator or the courts decide on
whether a claim is timely ultimately turns on the parties’ intent—or the
lack thereof. Although parties to a contract are free to vest the arbitrators with the power to determine issues of arbitrability, parties often
either fail to foresee this issue or to make their intent clear.
Absent a clear expression of the parties’ intent, courts may engage
in varied analyses to reach different and unpredictable results. The
parties’ agreement to arbitrate under rules containing limitations provisions may or may not be construed as evidence of their intent to resolve
limitations issues in the courts. Given the variety of decisions, those
drafting arbitration agreements must give thoughtful consideration to
how the parties’ intent in an arbitration agreement will be expressed,
particularly with respect to any threshold matter they prefer courts,
rather than the arbitration panel, to determine.

Section 15 establishes a limitation of six years as an explicit procedural guideline
for arbitration. National Association of Securities Dealers Rule 15.
66

